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HOW DEFINITIVE IS FOURTH AMENDMENT 
TEXTUALISM? 
Evan H. Caminker* 
Review of Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. 
L. REV. 233 (2019). 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Jeffrey Bellin’s excellent article advances a comprehensive and 
straightforward textual approach to determining what policing activities 
constitute “searches” triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
Bellin’s thesis is that a text-based approach to interpreting the Amendment 
is superior to the Supreme Court’s current approach,1 which ever since Katz 
v. United States2 has defined “search” primarily by reference to a non-textual 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. After soundly criticizing the 
ungrounded and highly subjective nature of the Katz test, Bellin declares that 
the Court should instead simply follow where the text leads: the Amendment 
protects people from a search, meaning an “examination of an object or 
space to uncover information”3 of their own “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.”4 No more, no less. Such a textual approach generates new doctrinal 
rules that would replicate Katz’s outcomes in many respects and provide ei-
ther more or less protection in others. 
But Bellin’s reformist agenda isn’t driven by outcomes.5 Rather, he 
claims two primary advantages: his approach “infuses [Fourth Amendment] 
jurisprudence with a heavy dose of legitimacy and determinacy.”6 Textual-
ism promotes legitimacy because it dictates a specific doctrine; and textual-
ism promotes determinacy because that doctrine “asks clearer questions and 
provides clearer answers than the Katz test, leaving fewer opportunities for 
subjectivity to infiltrate the doctrine.”7 In other words, Bellin claims, a text-
 
 * Branch Rickey Collegiate Professor of Law (and former Dean), University of Michi-
gan Law School. 
 1. Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 234–37 
(2019). 
 2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 3. Bellin, supra note 1, at 257 (emphasis omitted). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 5. Bellin, supra note 1, at 281. 
 6. Id. at 283. 
 7. Id. at 281. 
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based approach generates doctrinal rules that are more justifiable and objec-
tive than does the Court’s Katz-based approach. 
I find Bellin’s prescribed doctrinal rules acceptable on the whole—
perhaps even preferable. But I’m not as quickly convinced that his rules are 
either more determined by text or more determinate of clear answers. 
Bellin ably covers so much ground that I can’t fully develop these reac-
tions in this brief Essay. Building on Professor Christopher Slobogin’s excel-
lent review that succinctly lays out Bellin’s entire textualist project,8 I’ll dive 
deeper into two specific definitional claims to illustrate two general points. 
First, as Bellin derives his proffered definitions for a Fourth Amendment 
“search,” he unearths but silently dismisses alternative definitions that are 
equally consistent with the constitutional text. I’ll sketch two such alterna-
tives here: (1) police activity constitutes a “search” only if it “uncovers” some 
erstwhile barrier to ordinary human perception of the information acquired; 
and (2) a “search” triggers Fourth Amendment protection if it acquires in-
formation tethered to the target’s person, house, papers, or effects, even if it 
does not directly search any of those things. 
Second and relatedly, choosing among text-consistent definitions re-
quires looking beyond the language. Indeed, while claiming his project di-
vines the Amendment’s original public meaning,9 Bellin admits to “drawing 
on historical sources, textual interpretation, and common sense”10 though he 
doesn’t explain what underlying values drive his “common sense” judg-
ments. This quiet concession confirms that textualism may help constrain 
options, but it cannot by itself resolve all Fourth Amendment interpretive 
questions. 
I. “UNCOVERING” SEARCHES 
Bellin defines “search” to mean “examination of an object or space to 
uncover information,” each term of which “fleshes out an intuitive aspect of 
the widely understood meaning of the term.”11 In brief, “examination” en-
tails “a degree of conscious effort” rather than automatic human percep-
tion.12 “[O]f an object or space” rules out more metaphorical definitions 
(such as searching for truth or searching one’s brain).13 And, of greatest in-
 
 8. Christopher Slobogin, The Sacred Fourth Amendment Text, 119 MICH. L. REV. 
ONLINE 17 (2020). 
 9. Bellin embraces “the ‘new textualism’ approach” that “start[s] with a determination, 
based on evidence from the text, structure, and enactment history, of what the language in the 
Constitution actually means,” which he also describes as divining the Constitution’s “original 
public meaning.” Bellin, supra note 1, at 237–38 n.24, 256 n.161 (quoting James E. Ryan, Lay-
ing Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1524 
(2011)). 
 10. Bellin, supra note 1, at 255. 
 11. Id. at 257 (emphasis omitted). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 257–58. 
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terest to me here, “uncover information” entails a purposive effort to obtain 
information “that is hidden or otherwise not apparent,” which in turn means 
the information is not “already apparent through standard visual and audio 
observation” (I’ll shorten this to “standard perception”).14 
Thus defined, “search” excludes many commonplace investigative ef-
forts such as observing a fleeing suspect,15 estimating a suspect’s height in a 
public place (and presumably mentally recording any other visible fea-
tures),16 observing a house’s exterior and readily visible interior,17 and read-
ing a car’s license plate.18 These exemplars are not “searches” for Bellin 
because the desired information is already apparent to the police through 
standard perception. 
This is surely a commonsensical position. Indeed, although Bellin 
doesn’t directly compare them, this component of his proposed definition 
mimics Katz jurisprudence. Under Katz, people lack a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in information they have exposed to others.19 In each of the 
previous paragraph’s exemplars, the person, house, and car in public view 
expose those things (losing Katz privacy protection) in a way that makes the 
information obtained “readily apparent” (losing Bellin search protection). 
Depending on how Bellin would apply “readily apparent,” these two doc-
trines sufficiently converge to make Bellin’s endpoint seem eminently sensi-
ble.20 
That said, I’m not persuaded that Bellin’s position is determined by  
(rather than merely consistent with) textualism in a meaningful sense, origi-
nal public meaning or otherwise.21 
Bellin first points to “historical sources,” offering a cursory review of the 
two British cases widely viewed as generating the Framers’ worries about 
abusive searches of houses per general warrants.22 Although this history cer-
tainly suggests “search” must encompass such practices, it doesn’t guide a 
choice among potential broader applications. And even if “Framing-era 
Americans thought the term ‘search’ was self-explanatory,”23 that doesn’t 
help us now. 
 
 14. Id. at 257–59. 
 15. Id. at 257. 
 16. Id. at 258–59. 
 17. Id. at 276–77. 
 18. Id. at 277. 
 19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 20. Bellin’s test is broader in one important respect. Under Katz, public exposure to 
anyone defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy. For Bellin, police conduct a search if they 
acquire information that is not readily apparent to them, even if it might be readily apparent to 
members of the public through standard perception. Bellin, supra note 1, at 259 n.171. In this 
respect, Bellin would find searches even where Katz would not. 
 21. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 22. Bellin, supra note 1, at 255–56. 
 23. Id. at 256. 
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Bellin then offers a more straightforward “textual interpretation,” refer-
encing four Framing-era dictionary definitions. Collectively, the definitions 
for “search” include these: “to seek after something lost, hid, or unknown”;24 
“[t]o examine; to try; to explore; to look through”;25 “[t]o look over or 
through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by in-
spection”;26 and “[t]o seek, look for, or be in quest of.”27 
To my mind, these definitions sort into two different sets. The first and 
more relaxed set includes “to examine,” to “explore,” “to seek,” and “to look 
for” (along with their variants). These terms do support Bellin’s requirement 
of intentional examination rather than inadvertent glance, but I see nothing 
in these terms suggesting that an effort to obtain information isn’t a “search” 
just because the information is “readily apparent” through standard human 
perception. Surely I “seek” or “look for” crumbs on a table or letters in a 
mailbox even though, if present, they will be readily apparent. Returning to 
Bellin’s exemplars, police “examine/explore/seek/look for” information 
when they estimate a suspect’s height, read a house’s address, and read a 
car’s license plate even though the information is readily apparent based on 
standard human vision. So when Bellin insists that a “search” requires in-
formation acquisition that is not readily apparent, he clearly embraces a nar-
rower definition than this set of broad terms implies. 
The second and much stricter set of Framing-era definitions for “search” 
includes “to seek after something hid” or “to look over or through.” These 
terms suggest that some sort of sensory barrier initially obstructs direct ac-
cess to the information, such that the information is “hid[den]” and the po-
lice must “look over or through” the obstruction.28 Notably, Bellin appears to 
capture this stricter notion by insisting that a Fourth Amendment search 
must “uncover” information. And the Framing-era dictionaries he consults 
for “search” underscore this overcome-an-obstruction notion with respect to 
“uncover” as well. Those early dictionaries containing an entry for “uncover” 
define its general sense by clearly referencing some tangible, perception- 
obscuring item: “to divest of a covering” and “to shew openly; to strip off a 
veil, or concealment,”29 and “to divest of a cover; to remove any covering 
 
 24. Id. at 255 (quoting JAMES BARCLAY, A COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY ON A NEW PLAN (1782)). 
 25. Id. (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Lon-
don, 6th ed. 1785)). 
 26. Id. (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828)). 
 27. Id. at 255 n.147 (quoting N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789)). 
 28. “Look over or through” is somewhat ambiguous—it might fall in set two as in “to 
look over or through an otherwise obscuring object” (such as a fence or curtain), or it might 
fall in set one as in “to look over or through something thoroughly or carefully” (such as a 
book index). 
 29. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, 6th ed. 
1785). 
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from” and “to strip of a vail [original spelling], or of anything that conceals; 
to lay open; to disclose to view.”30 
These definitions of Bellin’s “uncover” component suggest that police 
“search” for information only when the information is initially covered by 
something that frustrates the police’s ability to perceive it through standard 
visual or audio observation, and then the police do something to actively 
remove, pierce, or otherwise overcome that obstacle so that afterwards 
standard perception suffices to obtain the previously inaccessible (or “hid-
den”) information. This definition is consistent with the Framers’ worries 
about general warrants for house inspections; the house’s physical structure 
“covered” the items and papers inside, and the writs “uncovered” the con-
tents by permitting officers to enter the enclosed structure (or to coerce the 
owner to bring papers outside). Indeed, the definition encompasses pretty 
much all old-school searches that physically overcome tangible barriers or 
coverings, such as “when police enter residences, offices, and cars looking for 
information” and “when they look inside a bag, pat down someone’s pock-
ets, or manipulate a smart phone to access the data inside.”31 And, depend-
ing on how one translates original public meanings into modern contexts, 
the definition encompasses police use of modern technologies to overcome 
tangible barriers or coverings, such as “when they attempt to gather infor-
mation with metal detectors” (of objects hidden underneath clothing or in 
boxes, etc.) or with “heat sensors” (of heat contained behind walls, etc.).32 
If Bellin stopped here, he’d have a defensible text-based definition: a 
“search” entails the physical or technological circumvention of some sort of 
covering or barrier that initially precludes police from acquiring information 
through normal visual, audio, or other sensory perception. And, I submit, 
 
 30. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New 
York, S. Converse 1828). The other definitions involve specific examples of physical uncover-
ings, including removal of clothing, roofs, and hats. Id. 
 Contemporary usage continues to suggest that “uncover” means to undo, to circumvent, 
or to pierce something that obstructs standard sensory perception of an underlying thing, 
though some definitions might invite a broader perspective. Popular dictionaries define “un-
cover” with such terms as “to expose to view by removing some covering,” to “lay open or bare 
by the removal of some covering thing or matter,” and “to deprive of protection” (which clear-
ly involve overcoming a barrier to perception), along with “to make known,” to “bring to 
light,” to “lay bare,” to “disclose,” or to “discover (something previously secret or unknown)” 
(admittedly somewhat less clear). See, e.g., Uncover, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/uncover [https://perma.cc/AY8U-H54J]; Uncover, CAMBRIDGE 
DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/uncover [https://perma.cc
/X569-QP3Z]; Uncover, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/uncover 
[https://perma.cc/9MW8-7DAD]; Uncover, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, https://www
.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/uncover [https://perma.cc/6JEH-A242]; Uncover, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/210997 (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review); Uncover, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/uncover 
[https://perma.cc/Y7X8-ZVAG]. 
 31. Bellin, supra note 1, at 259. 
 32. Id. 
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this definition could support a plausible and provocative set of doctrinal 
rules. 
But Bellin does not appear to stop here, as he instead translates “uncov-
er” into the broader concept of “hidden or otherwise not apparent” and 
sometimes illustrates uncoverings through scenarios that don’t involve over-
coming any obstruction. For example, Bellin juxtaposes two different police 
efforts to obtain information from inside a house. First, he says, “[p]ointing a 
flashlight or binoculars at a house to identify the address, or the source of a 
strange noise, is not a search of the house” because “[t]he police officer who 
observes the house’s exterior, and even what is displayed in a window, gleans 
only what is already apparent.”33 In other words, standing outside and look-
ing through the window to see objects sitting on an interior windowsill is not 
a search. Second, by contrast, “[s]tanding on a porch ‘to peer through your 
windows, into your home’s furthest corners’ . . . is a search of the house” be-
cause “[t]he officer on the porch using a flashlight or binoculars to peer into 
the house examines the house to uncover information, conducting a Fourth 
Amendment ‘search.’ ”34 In other words, standing outside and looking 
through the window to see objects much further inside the house is a search. 
Although Bellin may be correct that only the second observation of the 
house’s furthest corners acquires information that’s not “readily apparent,” 
it’s difficult to attribute this conclusion to any police activity removing an 
erstwhile barrier to standard perception. Let’s ponder some options. 
Perhaps the window constitutes a “cover” that the second observation 
circumvents? We don’t normally think of a presumably transparent window 
as imposing a barrier for human vision. Of course, if the police officer in the 
second scenario cleared some smudges off the glass or pushed aside leaves 
that didn’t obscure vision of a large object on the interior windowsill but did 
initially obscure vision of items deeper within the house, her acts of clearing 
the window for better sight would easily qualify as uncovering. Here’s a 
harder case: suppose the officer could see large items on the windowsill but 
nothing beyond because the window reflected most light due to glare of sun-
shine or reflection of streetlamps, or because partly closed blinds made it dif-
ficult to identify objects that were visible but positioned further back. And 
suppose the officer in the second scenario repositioned herself by moving 
closer or taking a different angle until the reflection dissipated or the blinds 
obscured less. Moving to improve her sightline circumvented the erstwhile 
barrier to her vision, even without her physically removing a tangible barrier. 
Should this qualify as uncovering? Interesting questions abound as to what 
 
 33. Id. at 276–77 (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 12 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
concurring)). 
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acts might qualify as overcoming an obstruction. But Bellin doesn’t explore 
let alone rely on them.35 
Or perhaps using a flashlight or binoculars circumvents some erstwhile 
barrier to standard perception? This also can’t explain Bellin’s distinction, as 
the officer uses these tools in both of Bellin’s aforementioned scenarios. But 
again, this hypothesis is interesting. Might we view the flashlight as over-
coming an intangible barrier imposed by darkness (as in “under cover of 
darkness”), treating the darkness as interfering with a standard of normal 
daytime vision? Perhaps other technologies might similarly overcome such 
intangible barriers, such as infra-red goggles detecting things “through cover 
of” darkness or fog, or parabolic microphones detecting sounds “through 
cover of” ambient noise.36 A rule encompassing intangible as well as tangible 
“coverings” would also be interesting to explore, potentially defining some 
efforts as “searches” that Katz jurisprudence does not.37 
So when comparing Bellin’s two scenarios (which again both involve 
perception-enhancing technologies), the second police act of “peer[ing] . . . 
into your home’s furthest corners” seems not to be associated with piercing 
or circumventing any erstwhile tangible or even intangible covering or sen-
sory barrier. Rather, in Bellin’s view, this second act apparently “uncovers” 
information, whereas the first act of seeing what’s “displayed in a window” 
does not, merely because the second act requires more effort―
“peering”―perhaps looking longer, squinting, or focusing more intently. In 
other words, whatever is visible in the house’s furthest corners is apparent, 
just not readily so. And again Bellin gets to this point by broadening “uncov-
er” to include information that is “hidden or otherwise not apparent” (or not 
“readily” or “already” apparent) rather than requiring any actual uncovering. 
So let’s take stock. In deriving his textual definition of Fourth Amend-
ment “search,” Bellin exercises discretion twice. First, he includes “uncover” 
as one component even though only some of his Framing-era dictionary def-
initions suggest such a concept, implicitly dismissing the broader definitions 
that would encompass “seeking” or “looking for” anything perceptible even 
if readily apparent. Second, he defines “uncover” to include obtaining in-
formation that is “hidden or otherwise not apparent,” implicitly dismissing a 
consistently narrower Framing-era definition that requires overcoming or 
circumventing some barrier to or interference with standard human percep-
tion. I think these two alternatives deserve greater consideration, whether by 
Bellin or others (including me!). In the end, perhaps “common sense” sup-
 
 35. He does describe the officer in the second scenario as standing on the house’s porch, 
but he doesn’t suggest that this explains the difference (either along the lines discussed above 
or any others). Id. at 276–78. 
 36. It’s difficult to extend the same characterization to binoculars, which might be said 
to transcend a natural distance limitation on visual perception but not to pierce erstwhile tan-
gible or intangible barriers to vision. Same for conventional eyeglasses, contact lenses, and 
hearing aids. 
 37. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) (using a flashlight to peer in-
side car isn’t a search). 
October 2020] How Definitive is Fourth Amendment Textualism? 29 
ports Bellin’s Goldilocks position. But this deep dive uncovers (hah!) one 
place (among several, in my view) where Bellin defines terms in a way that is 
consistent with―but certainly not determined by―a method meaningfully 
described as “textualism,” original public meaning or otherwise. 
Thus far I’ve focused on Bellin’s claim that his definition of “search” is 
more determined by the Fourth Amendment text, and therefore more “legit-
imate,” than Katz’s current approach. Recall that Bellin also claims that his 
definition enhances “determinacy” by “provid[ing] clearer answers” than 
does Katz.38 It’s worth noting that of the three plausible definitions of 
“search” discussed above, Bellin’s definition seems the least doctrinally de-
terminate. Equating “search” with “examine/explore/seek/look for” would 
provide very clear (if very broad) answers. And equating “search” with “to 
remove a cover” would provide fairly clear (if much narrower) answers, with 
some quibbling over tangible vs. intangible covers, etc. But equating “search” 
with “to acquire information not readily apparent” largely replicates the 
Katz-based test of whether the information has been publicly exposed, at 
least to the police. I’m not sure this approach moves the needle much re: de-
terminacy. 
II. SEARCH “OF” TETRAD OBJECTS 
Now let’s turn to a second Bellin proposal. While Katz protects people 
from any search that invades their reasonable expectations of privacy, Bel-
lin’s text-based approach would protect people from searches of only what I 
call their tetrad objects: “their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”39 More 
specifically, claims Bellin, the Fourth Amendment is triggered only if the 
search is of one of those objects and not merely informative about one of 
those objects. As he puts it: “The terms ‘persons, houses, places and effects’ 
are listed in the Fourth Amendment as potential objects of searches: things 
the police might search. These terms are not search outcomes: things police 
might find.”40 This search-of reading excludes Fourth Amendment scrutiny 
of many common surveillance practices. There’s a difference, he explains, 
between searching open space (whether by eyesight, satellite camera, or 
whatever) to locate a particular person/house/car and searching a particular 
person/house/car to determine its location. Police obtain the same infor-
mation―where the object is located―but only the second search triggers 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny as a search of a tetrad object.41 
 
 38. Bellin, supra note 1, at 281. 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 40. Bellin, supra note 1, at 260 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 41. Id. at 260–61. As elsewhere, I’m not convinced this line is as clear as Bellin suggests. 
Apparently police search open space to find a car when they use their own eyesight to track the 
car’s route, but they search the car itself if they affix to the car a beeper emitting signals that lets 
them remotely track the car’s location. Id. at 277. Why does the beeper necessarily “exam-
ine . . . the vehicle,” id., rather than examine space to find the car? Don’t the police search open 
airspace for a particular radio signal in order to locate the source of that signal from which they 
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Bellin declares that this search-of limitation “follows from the text,” 
without further explanation.42 But this simple pronouncement is complicat-
ed by his own recounting of the Amendment’s drafting history. 
When later defining the term “effects,” Bellin finds it significant that the 
Amendment’s language was derived from two state models. The Massachu-
setts Constitution stated: “Every subject has a right to be secure from all un-
reasonable searches and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and 
all his possessions.”43 And Virginians proposed “[t]hat every freeman has a 
right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and siezures [sic] of his 
person, his papers and his property.”44 Bellin uses the shift from “posses-
sions” and “property” in the state models to “effects” in the federal text to 
help define the latter term.45 
But note that both the Massachusetts and Virginia models specifically 
describe “searches . . . of” the listed objects, whereas the Fourth Amendment 
text does not. Rather, the enacted text gives people the right to be secure in 
their tetrad objects from unreasonable searches. That modified language 
does not quite say, as did the state models, that searches threatening the se-
curity of the tetrad objects must be searches of those objects. 
Indeed, the federal language is fully consistent with the notion that 
searches trigger Fourth Amendment coverage if they reveal information 
about those tetrad objects that violates their owner’s security. And if security 
is defined to encompass notions of privacy as well as property, one might 
just as plausibly declare it “follows from the text” that the Amendment pro-
tects people from unreasonable searches of anything when the search reveals 
information that violates their privacy interests in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects. 
Under this security-of approach, the information might be meaningfully 
tethered to a tetrad object in various ways. Perhaps it suffices that during the 
Framing era, the revealed information typically would have been hidden 
within one of those objects (say, information about the target’s sexual inter-
ests and habits typically would have been revealed only within her home). 
Perhaps it suffices that the revealed information is particularly intimate or 
sensitive and is about one of those objects (say, information about a tattoo 
on the target’s body). Perhaps other connections suffice. 
 
can infer the car’s location? Sure, the ping in some sense “comes from” the car. But when po-
lice visually follow a car, the information enabling the police to keep identifying its location 
(the car’s model, color, license plate) likewise “comes from” the car. Suppose instead the police 
secretly mount on the car’s hood a small video camera and view the camera’s live feed to de-
termine where the car is (by reading street signs, recognizing visible markers, etc.). Wouldn’t 
the police thereby search open space (in front of the car) through the affixed camera rather 
than search the car itself? How is this meaningfully different from using a beeper? 
 42. Id. at 260. 
 43. Id. at 263 (quoting MASS. CONST. art. XIV). 
 44. Id. (quoting THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND 
ORIGINS 343 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015)). 
 45. Id. at 262–66. 
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Such a security-of approach would trigger broader Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny than Bellin’s search-of limitation, but narrower scrutiny than Katz’s 
open-endedness. Contra Bellin’s position, the security-of approach might 
encompass searches that compromise Mary’s privacy qua security in her tet-
rad objects even if the searches were of something else―whether of someone 
else’s tetrad objects (say, a tattoo-revealing photo of Mary taken in her home 
by Bob who owns the “paper” photo), or indeed of something that isn’t a tet-
rad object at all (say, an open field in which Mary stands revealing her tat-
too). And contra Katz, the security-of approach might exclude, say, long-
term location information in which people have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy per Carpenter v. United States46 (absent a persuasive tethering argu-
ment that such information implicates one’s “person”), and it might also ex-
clude the conversation recorded in Katz itself (absent a persuasive tethering 
argument that such incriminating conversations would traditionally have 
not been overheard because they typically would have occurred inside a 
house47). 
Is this security-of limiting principle a better reading of the text than Bel-
lin’s search-of limiting principle? I dunno: it seems to me that either pro-
posal is consistent with the text and neither is driven by it. I’m hard-pressed 
to say that textualism, without more, clearly points in Bellin’s direction. 
CONCLUSION 
Bellin’s careful doctrinal analysis produces an eminently reasonable def-
inition of a Fourth Amendment-triggering search, one I might even ulti-
mately embrace―though only after exploring the counterproposals Bellin 
has provoked me to identify here. Despite the interpretive trappings, howev-
er, I think Bellin’s own position is neither as textually determined nor as 
doctrinally determinate as he claims. Perhaps it “outperform[s] Katz” in 
these respects.48 But the Fourth Amendment’s text can support multiple 
plausible interpretations, and choosing among them therefore requires some 
normative guidepost(s). Bellin himself invokes only “common sense” as if 
that’s self-defining, without explaining what underlying values make one po-
sition more commonsensible than others. In my view, Bellin must offer more 
to seal the deal. Despite his admirable efforts―for which he deserves great 
kudos―textualism may narrow the set of options, but it alone doesn’t dic-
tate all of the answers. 
 
 
 46. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 47. Bellin, supra note 1, at 265 n.213. This argument strikes me as quite a stretch. But 
note that Bellin himself teasingly suggests that “phone booths” might be included in the term 
“house” (which again questions how determinate the text might be). Id. at 265 n.213. 
 48. Id. at 281. 
